Almost certainly. The CRA applies to products whose intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes “a direct or indirect logical or physical data connection to a device or network” (Art. 2(1)). A USB cable to a laptop is a physical data connection to a device. The test doesn’t need a network, a radio or the internet.

What the text says

A physical connection is one made “through electrical, optical or mechanical interfaces, wires or radio waves” (Art. 3(9)). A USB port is an electrical interface on the end of a wire. Recital 9 lists “files” among the ways a product can be connected logically. So a memory card that carries firmware or data counts as well.

The Commission’s guidance of July 2026 doesn’t mention USB, memory cards or offline products. It does say where the line sits. Scope is “anchored not in the mere presence of electronics, but in the capacity of a product with digital elements to exchange digital information” (paragraph 26). A signal used only “to trigger or power a function, without conveying digitally encoded information” isn’t a data connection (paragraph 28).

When a USB port doesn’t bring a product in

A port wired for power only exchanges no digital information. A USB-C socket that charges a torch, with its data lines connected to nothing that reads them, doesn’t bring the torch into scope on its own.

Check the schematic, not the connector. If the data lines reach the microcontroller, we’d treat the port as a data connection, even if today’s firmware ignores them. The test is reasonably foreseeable use, and a firmware update can change what the port does. If you conclude a port is power-only, write down why.

An example from our own work

We recently looked at a handheld camera with no radio and no network stack. Its only links to anything else are a USB-C port and a memory card. Over USB, the firmware picks what the camera appears as: a storage drive, a webcam or a printer link (PictBridge). Updates are a file copied onto the card.

Scope was an easy call: both are data connections. The update file was the interesting part. We took the published firmware images apart, and each one ends in a two-byte checksum: the sum of every byte before it. There’s no signature. Anyone can change the image, correct those two bytes, and the camera installs it.

That matters more than it first looks, because of the USB port. The shipped firmware has no keyboard mode. But the chip’s USB stack picks its device class in software. A modified image, built with the chip vendor’s development kit, could make the camera present itself to a laptop as a keyboard and type commands.

The requirement this touches is integrity: protect programs and configuration “against any manipulation or modification not authorised by the user” (Annex I Part I (2)(f)). The fix is to sign updates and have the bootloader check the signature. That closes the keyboard route as well.

The rest of the camera’s risk assessment is short. With no network, many of the essential requirements have little to act on. The technical file has to say why for each one that doesn’t apply (Art. 13(4)), which takes a paragraph each, not a chapter.

If your product looks like this

  • Write the scope reasoning down. Which ports carry data, what they connect to, and why any power-only port is power-only.
  • Sign firmware updates, however they arrive: over USB, on a card or in the factory.
  • Ask your chip vendor for the SDK’s components and versions. The camera’s firmware had no version strings in it, so the SBOM had to come from the factory, not the binary.
  • Check the class. Most USB-only products are default class and can be self-assessed. The exception is a product whose core function is on the lists in Annex III or Annex IV; a hardware security key may be one.
  • Reporting already applies. A product like this on sale today is covered by the Article 14 reporting duty now.

If you aren’t sure which side of the line your product sits, the CRA checker asks the same questions. Our CRA assessment puts the answer in writing.